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LAW AND THE NEGRO REVOLUTION;
TEN YEARS LATER
HENRY P. MONAGHAN*

Scarcely ten years ago the Supreme Court of the United States sounded
the death knell for segregation in the public schools.' In so doing, the
high court in fact did much more, for its decision drew together and
united the diverse elements in American society which were arrayed
against segregation in all its forms. Thus began the great social upheaval
which we loosely term "the Negro revolution."
The broad goal is readily discernible. The Negro demands admittance
to American public life, to the schools, theatres, restaurants, hotels, job
opportunities and the like which comprise the "public" sector of our
society; in short, the Negro rejects the philosophy that he is a second
class citizen, one perpetually barred from many segments of public life.
And his revolution may be one without a significant historical parallel,
for it draws considerable strength from the law itself, which, in the main,
is committed to the same ends.
Ten years have witnessed enormous progress. A century of segregation has been shorn of its legal and moral underpinnings, and practices
which went unchallenged but a few short years ago are now dead or
dying. In the last few years the revolution has gathered enormous momentum, and it has taken on a far more pressing character. Promises no
longer satisfy; "with all deliberate speed" is no longer a part of the
Negro's vocabulary. The Negro demands admittance to the main stream
of American life now, not later, and he insists that apartheidbe torn root
and branch from every phase of American public life.
The Negro revolution is, however, approaching a critical juncture.
New tensions are becoming increasingly evident as the Negro seeks to
right the wrongs of centuries in less than a decade. The revolution's
accelerated pace, with its increasing and unyielding pressures for rapid
change, now threatens to push it considerably beyond what the legal
order can reasonably accept. Should this occur, no one can predict the
outcome. Some measure of repression would be inevitable, and this, in
turn, might transform the "revolution" to one of far more classic linesthat is, from one in which the Negro seeks admittance to American
society to one in which he rejects that society.
Thus, while the law may in the main buttress the goals of the Negro
revolution, parts of that revolution are moving on a collision course with
the necessary demands of the legal order, and this is fast becoming an
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston University.
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347

U.S. 497 (1954).
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issue of overriding concern. The purpose of this paper is to sketch
briefly some of the areas where the law and the Negro revolution are approaching open conflict.
I
The emerging conflicts between the law and the Negro revolution can
only be understood in the context of the strong bond that has existed
between the two. The tie has been one of significant proportion, one
rooted in the organic law itself. The fourteenth amendment to the constitution provides that, "[n]o state shall .

.

. deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," and it gives Congress
power to enforce this mandate "by appropriate legislation. ' 2 That this
great provision, born of the Civil War, was designed primarily to benefit the Negro is undisputed; indeed, shortly after it became part of the
constitution the Supreme Court went so far as to doubt whether anyone
other than a Negro would be permitted to invoke its protection. 8
Early decisions of the Supreme Court applying the equal protection
4
clause rigorously struck down state discrimination against the Negro.
But with the Civil Rights Cases5 in 1883, and Plessy v. Fergusone in
1896, utilization of that clause as the bridge for Negro access to American public life came to an abrupt halt. In the former cases, the Court,
over the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan, invalidated congressional legislation barring discrimination in public places, such as inns, theatres and
public conveyances; the fourteenth amendment, said the Court, prohibits
discrimination by the state, not by private persons. 7 In Plessy, the Court,
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
8 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
2

4 E.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
5 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

6 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

7 This is the fashion in which the case has been read for many years. In fact,
however, the majority opinion was much narrower; it held only that Congress
could not regulate private discriminatory conduct so long as there was no showing.
that in the given situation the state laws were inadequate or not enforced. 109
U.S. at 14; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883). See generally,

Frantz, "Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against

Private Acts," 73 Yale L.J. 1353 (1964). But this qualification was soon forgotten,
and the case was interpreted as the text indicates. But see Goldberg, J., concurring
in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 311 (1964).
Viewing the fourteenth amendment as authorizing Congressional legislation
against private discrimination where there is "a pervasive pattern of private

wrongs sheltered by state inaction" (Frantz, id. at 1356-57) may afford a satisfactory measure of Congressional power, although some questions-such as the
scope of judicial review over the legislative finding of illegal state inactionwould remain. But where Congress has not acted, this proposed standard apparently
would also enlarge the scope of judicial review so that "a pervasive pattern of
private wrongs sheltered by state inaction" would itself violate the fourteenth
amendment. If that be true, exceedingly difficult problems of judicial administration
would arise. Consider for example, what kind of a trial would be necessary under
this standard? What relief would be afforded? Would the failure of state courts to
afford tort relief to Negro plaintiff's result in orders (what kind?) against state
judges or juries, or would it result in federal court administration of state tort law?
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again over the dissent of Justice Harlan, held that, in the area of state
sponsored services, a state did not violate the equal protection clause
where it provided "separate but equal" facilities to Negroes. Reinforced
by these rulings, patterns of discrimination ingrained themselves deeply
into the fabric of southern society. Thus was the door slammed shut on
the Negro's dream of becoming an American.
The Civil Rights Cases still stand formally unreversed, but much of
the legislation there invalidated would now be sustained under congressional power to regulate commerce among the states. Erosion of the
Plessy philosophy soon set in 8 and, finally, it was repudiated altogether
in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education.9 Brown determined that separate but equal "had no place" in public school education; Brown's
progeny made it abundantly clear that separate but equal had no place in
any state or federal activity.9 a
The bond forged between the law and Negro aspirations is, therefore,
of strong metal. Neither the federal government nor the states may impose patterns of discrimination upon society. Moreover, it is generally
acknowledged that either the states or the federal government may, if
it so chooses, go further and prohibit discrimination in most public
sectors of the society, in theatres, restaurants and employment, for example.' 0 In sum, the legal foundations of segregation have been completely undermined.
It seems to me that as a measure of judicial power under the fourteenth amendment,
state inaction poses insoluble administrative problems.
8 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) is in principle inconsistent with
Plessy. See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S.
631 (1948) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
9 See note 1 supra.
9a E.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches
and bathhouses) ; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal
golf courses) ; Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (state imposed segregation
on busses) ; New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (public parks and golf courses) ; State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359
U.S. 533 (1959) (state statute forbidding integrated athletic contests) ; Turner v.
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (administrative requirement of segregation in
airport restaurant) ; Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtrooms)
Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (municipal auditoriums).
10 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga.
1964) which was argued before the Supreme Court on October 5 (33 L.W. 3109),
is expected to confirm this and become the leading precedent on the subject. In
Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment
Limitations on Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 49 Cornell L.Q. 228 (1964), Alfred
Avins argues that much of the anti-discrimination legislation is invalid because it
requires "involuntary servitude" which the Thirteenth Amendment forbids. This
thesis is utter nonsense. It is without historical support (Schreiber, The Thirteenth
Amendment and Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: A Reappraisal, 49 Cornell L.Q. 508 (1964)), and is analytically unsound. It was ridiculed
by the Solicitor General in his argument in the Heart of Atlanta case (33 L.W.
3122), and in a letter to the New York Times (N.Y. Times, May 6, 1964, p. 24,
col. 6), I wrote in relevant part:
"One's occupational activities, like all his other activities, are subject to

470

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

However, the Negro desire for admittance to the main stream of
American public life is one thing, the techniques employed to achieve
that end quite another. It is here that tremendous demands are placed
upon the legal system-demands, in part at least, to which it cannot
accede. And it is precisely because use of these techniques for the first
time threatens to push the Negro revolution beyond acceptable limits
that the revolution portends crises of an entirely different order than
any we have yet faced.
In the recent past, two major techniques have been employed to
achieve general public integration: (a) the unyielding demand for
eradication of de facto segregation in the public schools; (b) the "ins"
technique-sit-ins, stall-ins, lie-ins, pull-ins, kneel-ins, etc. These two
techniques will be considered in some detail in the next two sections of
this paper., for both represent the Negro knocking for admittance to
American public life, and both strain the legal system. Moreover, another technique is now emerging, the call for "special treatment" for
the Negro. Since its philosophy seems to me also to lie at the core of
reasonable regulation, and 'may be restricted or prohibited in the public
interest' (Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951)). Accordingly,
it is hardly possible to argue that it is unreasonable to condition one's continuance in an occupation serving the public on one's willingness to serve the
entire public, irrespective of the color of their skin.
"Nor does such a condition violate the 13th Amendment. That amendment,
as the Court pointed out in Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944), is designed to 'maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout
the United States'; accordingly, 'no state can make the quitting of work any
component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to labor,' although, presumably, the quitter may be compelled
to respond in damages for breach of contract. In short, an employee may not
be tied to his employer.
"But it is beyond reason to suggest that if the Government conditions a
restaurateur's right to remain in business upon a willingness to serve all
persons, a waitress of that restaurant suffers 'involuntary servitude.' Clearly
her involuntary servitude, if any, would be to her employer, not to the restaurant's patron, and anti-discrimination legislation does not purport to regulate
the employer-employee relationship.
"Under the 14th Amendment, a state, which acts only through its agents,
cannot discriminate on the basis of race. Are state agents, therefore, forced
into involuntary servitude by being forced to 'serve' Negroes as well as
Whites? Does the 14th Amendment contradict the 13th Amendment?
"Moreover, for the individual proprietor, like a barber, there is no involuntary servitude; he is free to quit and to move into any job which permits
him to discriminate. But if he chooses a public calling, it is hardly tenable
to suggest that anti-discrimination legislation impairs his constitutional rights.
"From time immemorial certain occupations, for example, innkeepers and
common carriers have not been permitted to refuse their services on the basis
of race. Anti-discrimination legislation merely extends the categories of public
calling prevented from discriminating on racial lines. In Dist. of Columbia v.
John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953), the Court, in passing upon
an act which made it a crime for the owners or managers of restaurants to
discriminate on the basis of race, said:
'And certainly so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is
no doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race in the use of facilities serving a public function is within the police
power of the states.'"
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Negro efforts to eradicate de facto segregation, it will be considered in
that context.11
II
De facto segregation in the public schools is a concept shrouded in a
less than charming imprecision, but is precise enough as a starter. "It
results," writes Professor John Kaplan, "where an otherwise fair school
districting is superimposed upon privately segregated housing patterns."' 1 A fairly typical pattern has emerged. Social and economic
discriminations have forced most Negroes to cluster into ghettos. The
local school boards maintain a neighborhood school policy (one in
which children are required to attend schools located near their homes)
and, accordingly, the schools are segregated in fact. Newspapers constantly remind us that this condition exists in every city of any size; it
often goes under a euphemism, "racial imbalance."
Negro opposition to de facto segregation is, in my judgment, the key
to understanding the psychology of the Negro revolution. Most leaders
of the Negro revolution do not at all see the battle in terms of eliminating
intentional segregation in the public schools, or of improving the generally inferior educational character of the public schools in the Negro
neighborhood. They are in fact not primarily interested in education in
the traditional sense. Quite to the contrary; public school education is to
them but one battleground of the Negro revolution, and must be viewed
as such. The demand is for integration into the mainstream of society,
and it is thought, not without justification, that the door to integrated
11 Before discussing these techniques and the problems they pose for the legal
system, one other factor should be noted briefly. The past summer has seen Negro
rioting and violence in such cities as New York, Philadelphia and Rochester.
Admittedly, the significance of this for the Negro revolution is difficult to assess
at this point. But I greatly doubt that this sporadic violence can yet be taken
to be part and parcel of the revolution. No Negro leader espouses these methods
as permissible techniques for bringing about public integration. Quite to the
contrary. Negro leaders have made every effort to avoid violence, have publicly
disclaimed its use, and have pressed for an investigation into the sources of the
riots to determine if they are being organized by subversive elements (e.g., N.Y.
Times, Sept. 10, 1964, p. 1, col. 5). Moreover, there is considerable basis for the
belief that the rioting had less to do with segregaton vel non than with the humid
summer weather and an unusually high unemployment rate among Negro youth
(e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1964, p. 82, col. 1). In any event, it is apparent
that if violence becomes a significant aspect of the Negro movement, the "revolution" will have moved to an entirely different level. Violence is not an approach
to Negro integration into public society; it is a total repudiation of that goal.
Indeed, it is only to the extent that the Negro revolution is able to employ
techniques that stay tolerably well within the limits of the law, thereby minimizing
violence, that it has any realistic chance of achieving its ultimate goal. And this,
of course, restates the central importance of the inquiry with respect to the
techniques which have been and are presently being used. Clearly, violence is
likely to occur if "peaceful" techniques like sit-ins are used in a fashion which
the law does not sanction.
12 Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 157, 159 (1963).
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living must open at the earliest stage, that if integrated living does not
occur at the school level, its prospects elsewhere are made considerably
more difficult. The Negro insists, therefore, that for him the evils of
segregation are the same, whether the segregation be intentional or
unintentional, de jure or de facto. Yet, it is here that potential conflict
with the legal system occurs, for while the law unequivocally condemns
intentional segregation of public facilities, it probably does not forbidindeed, it may in some circumstances require--de facto segregation.
Negro efforts directed toward compelling local school boards to take
affirmative steps to eradicate racial imbalance have as yet yielded small
returns. The school boards have, by and large, refused to act, insisting
that the neighborhood school district has not been drawn with a hostile
eye and that the complained of segregation results from factors over
which they have no control.1ISimilarly unavailing have been Negro
attempts to convince courts that de facto segregation denies them "equal
protection of the laws.' a4 In the leading case, which involved the racially
imbalanced schools in Gary, Indiana, United States District Judge
George Beamer refused any relief. 1 "The neighborhood school," he said,
"is a long and well established institution in American public school
education," and there is no requirement, "that a school system developed
on the neighborhood school plan, honestly and conscientiously constructed with no intention or purpose to segregate the races, must be
destroyed or abandoned because the resulting effect is to have a racial
imbalance in certain schools where the district is populated almost entirely by Negroes or whites."' 6 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit unanimously affirmed, expressly approving Judge Beamer's language. 17 The Supreme Court declined to review the case, thereby leaving
it at least temporarily as the benchmark. But consideration of the question by the high court cannot be postponed much longer. Other cases
posing the issue are pending, indeed well over two dozen of them.
Some courts, it is true, have suggested that the mere fact that the
public schools are racially unbalanced is unconstitutional. The California
13 Limited efforts by school officials to break down de facto segregation are
now being taken in New York City. The results will bear special watching. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1964, § 4 (Editorials), p. 11, col. 1.
14 The New Rochelle schools were thought by some to present a good "test
case," but the problem was mooted when a district court and a divided court of
appeals found intentional segregation. Taylor v. Board of Education, 294 F.2d 36
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). For a thorough discussion of the
litigation, see Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part I: The New
Rochelle Experience, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1963).
15 Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1963) ; Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and
the Schools-Part III: The Gary Litigation, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 121 (1964).
16 213 F. Supp. at 829.
17 324 F.2d at 213.
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Supreme Court recently-and obscurely-observed that "even in the
absence of the gerrymandering or other affirmative discriminatory conduct by a school board, a student under some circumstances would be
entitled to relief where, by reason of residential segregation, substantial
racial imbalance exists in the schools."' 8 The views of some of the federal district judges in New York apparently tend in the same direction.' 9
I confess that to me this seems quite untenable. It is unfortunate that the
Negro be excluded from an integrated education, whatever the reason.
But, quite apart from the impossibility of finding in the constitution a
measuring rod to determine the amount of "imbalance" which will be
"unconstitutional," the source of the discrimination is important, and
here the source is economic, not legal. 20 In addition, if there were a constitutional obligation on a school board to maximize integration, by what
standard would a court determine whether the board had discharged that
obligation? How, for example, does a court "weigh the achievement of
integration through bussing children as against the greater cost and a
somewhat larger class size," 21 to mention but a few of the factors the
local school boards would be compelled to consider? Questions of the
organization of a school system present intricate problems which are
peculiarly nonjudicial in character. "[P]erhaps the best we can expect,"
observes Professor Kaplan, is that the school boards "remain neutral as
far as race is concerned. It is difficult to find in the Constitution support
'22
for any greater duty.
Moreover, affirmative attempts to correct racial imbalance in the
schools gloss over a problem of fundamental significance. The argument
often made is that even if a school board is not constitutionally compelled
to eliminate de facto segregation, it nay and should do so as a matter of
sound educational policy, at least within reasonable limits, because over
the long run the entire educational program will benefit and, in addition,
*the Negro dream-and moral claim-to integration into the main stream
of American life will become a reality. Thus, for example, it is said that
in selecting a site for a new school house or in drawing school boundaries
the school board should consider, among other things, whether its action
18 Jackson v. Pasadena School Bd., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881, 382 P.2d 878, 881, 31
Cal. Rptr. 606, 609 (1963).
19 Blocker v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Branche

v. Board of Education, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
20 Kaplan, supra note 12, at 171 et seq. contains a good discussion of the subject.
21 Id. at 183.
22 Id. at 186. Of course, some of what passes for de facto segregation may be but
a cover for intentional segregation. For example, a neighborhood school policy set
against a background of enforced housing segregation would seem to be unconstitutional. But where the state or local government has abandoned sponsoring residential segregation there seems to me to be a point at which the present neighborhood school policy is no longer tarred by the brush of other past illegality. This
problem was presented in the New Rochelle School case and is discussed by
Professor Kaplan, supra note 14, at 36-38.
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will cut down racial imbalance. There is, of course, a good deal more
than surface charm to this proposition. But it cloaks a question of far
reaching importance: May a state, consistent with the constitution, take
any affirmative action to promote racial balance? If a state is forbidden
to force the races apart, is it equally forbidden to force them together?
The arguments for integration are persuasive, but it does not follow
that this result may be reached through governmental action specifically
designed to compel racial integration or racial balance. Brown specifically condemns discrimination against the Negro solely because of his
color; is governmental action to promote or to compel integration any the
more constitutionally permissible? And if it be permissible, what of its
wisdom?
The constitutional problem takes its roots in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, because the question is whether
the recent segregation cases adopt his view that "[olur constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens ....
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his.., color when
his civil rights ...are involved.12 3 When Brown was first decided, it
was fashionable to "explain" it in these terms. But if the explanation
be correct, it is hard for me to see that racial considerations may enter
the picture to help the Negro any more than to hurt him. Nor is the fact
that I do not doubt the general constitutionality of anti-discrimination
legislation inconsistent with this view, 24 for it is one thing to tell a landlord or an employer that, like the state, he may not discriminate on the
basis of race-that he must choose on a non-racial basis from whoever
comes along-but quite another for the government to seek or require a
specific racial balance in its school or its business establishments. State
power to bar discrimination provides no automatic source for state power
to foster or to decree integration. Once the legal basis for discrimination
in the public sector of American life is removed, the amount of actual
integration which results is, many feel, constitutionally required to be
left to the free play of the "private" forces in our society.
Classifications based upon race are anathema to our jurisprudence,
and they are almost invariably held unconstitutional under the fifth or
fourteenth amendments. 25 Nonetheless, it must be conceded that governmental action designed to promote racial balance presents novel constitutional problems. First, previously invalidated action by the government on racial lines has, without exception, been hostile to the minority.
23
24
25

163 U.S. at 559.
See note 10 supra.
But some racial classifications may be valid. See Korematsu v. United States,

323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Douglas, We The Judges 399 (1956). And it seems apparent

that the state may obtain statistical information on race. Hamm v. Virginia State
Board of Electors, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd per curiam 33 L.W.
3153.
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Secondly, and more importantly, to hold unconstitutional action aimed at
integrating the Negro into American society is to make ironic use of the
fourteenth amendment. The plight of the Negro gave it birth, and it was
at the very minimum intended to be a shield protecting him from hostile
legislation, not a sword cutting down measures designed to hasten his
entry into American public life. Accordingly, it is likely that the governmental action designed affirmatively to promote integration would not
be invalid per se; rather, it might be measured against the traditional
"due process" standard for passing upon the validity of regulatory
legislation: is it reasonable, given the interests at stake?
Application of such a flexible standard to this problem has all the
virtues inherent in its flexibility, for it does not out-of-hand condemn
action designed to promote Negro integration into American society.
And, given the peculiar role of the public school as the gateway to
American public life, it-generally, at least-would not be unreasonable
for a school board to affirmative action to obtain racial imbalance, as, for
example, by some limited "bussing." 26 But whatever its acceptability in
the field of education,27 a general governmental policy designed to promote racial integration presents subtle and complex constitutional questions of grave moment. This is easily seen if consideration be given to
the validity of governmental attempts to impose "benign quotas" in
housing and employment, and the sole constitutional standard is assumed
to be the traditional one of the "reasonableness" of the action taken in
light of the existing context and the legislative objectives. 2 1
Housing
Suppose the population of a given city were 30 percent Negro. What
of the validity of a state law or city ordinance requiring persons operating
public housing developments (or even large private developments) to
admit at least 30 pecent Negroes, if they apply. Could not this minimum
quota requirement reasonably be defended on the ground that some
preference to Negroes is necessary to break down deeply ingrained
patterns of residential segregation?
26 Where the school board action (for example, in selecting a school site or
drawing a school district line) would be wholly unobjectionable if the board had
not considered race, it is a fortiori constitutional under the above view.
27 After a somewhat halting approach, the New York courts seem committed to
application of the reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d
193, cert. denied 33 L.W. 3140 (1964) ; See 16 Stan. L. Rev. 434 (1964).
28 The existing case law on the subject is sketchy at best (e.g., Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950) ; Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964), adhered
to on rehearing, 335 F.2d 417) and cannot be taken as precluding a complete reexamination of the problem. For a brilliant discussion of the problems raised see
Bittker, The Case of the Checker Board Ordinance, 71 Yale L.J. 1387 (1962) ; and
see Kaplan, supra note 12, at 171 et seq.; Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal
Protection and The Rule in Shelley's Case, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 531 (1963).
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Take the matter one step further. Suppose that the law or ordinance
limited the percentage of Negro residents in public housing projects to
a specified percentage, for example 25 per cent, on the premise that if
there were a higher percentage of Negroes the non-Negroes would
move out, thus defeating the end of integration. Obviously, such a percentage limitation might be honestly drawn not to impose segregation
but to promote integration, since it is common knowledge that housing
projects and residential areas (and public schools) have "tipping points"
-points at which the admission of additional Negroes would generate
a mass exodus of Whites. Accordingly, might not the legislative body
"reasonably" conclude that, by defining maximum percentages, Whites
would be encouraged to remain in the area, and property values would
remain relatively stable? Can such legislation fairly be characterized as
arbitrary or unreasonable? If not, consider a more extreme regulation,
also defended on the same basis. Suppose that a city amended its zoning
code to specify for each of its residential zones the maximum permissible
percentage of Negro residents: for example, in Zone 1 not more than
50 per cent Negro; in Zone 2, not more than 33 per cent Negro, etc.
Would this, too, be valid ?29
Employment
Suppose that a state law compelled a manufacturer to choose qualified
Negroes over qualified Whites until certain racial percentages were
achieved; or, alternatively, suppose that the statute compelled a manufacturer to give preference to qualified Negroes over qualified Whites
for a limited period, for example, two years. As in the housing area,
reasons can be adduced to justify governmental action of this type. The
Negro points out that, even where statutes forbidding employers to discriminate on a racial basis are observed, White workers have had the
benefits of a century of segregation, and this fact renders Negro access
to employment far more difficult than anti-discrimination statutes recognize. Accordingly, some special treatment is necessary to break the log
jam, treatment similar in kind, it is said, to that accorded veterans following the war. Are such statutes arbitrary or unreasonable?3o
In a paper of this scope there is neither space nor time to explore in
any detail the constitutional problems raised by these possible governmental attempts to promote integration. A few general observations
must suffice.
The notion that the government should affirmatively promote integra29 Are the Negroes who are excluded because of attempts at racial balance
denied equal protection or due process? Is their situation any different from that
of excluded Whites?

30

For other examples see Bittker, supra note 28, at 1411-13.
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tion is often said to be nothing short of preferential treatment for the
Negro, a form of "reverse discrimination" in his favor. But the rejoinder
is obvious. Given two centuries of slavery and segregation, such action
can hardly be viewed as placing the Negro in a "preferred position."8 1
Rather, the Negro insists that one way of achieving "equal protection
of the laws" is to correct the lingering injustices caused by racial discrimination. And be maintains that some special consideration is necessary to put him into the main stream of American public life, and, in a
sense, is comparable to the aid given to underdeveloped nations in an
attempt to pull them into the twentieth century.
Nonetheless, I am still greatly troubled by the general prospect of
affirmative governmental action to promote* integration, particularly
when it takes the benign quota form. Such "special treatment" might in
fact cover discrimination in states which seek "token" integration, but
the objection runs much deeper than that. We surrender something if our
government adopts a policy of viewing men differently because of the
texture of their skin, or the content of their creed. This is, is it not, in
large part what gave rise to "The Negro Problem" in the first place and
is what the Negro revolution now seeks to obliterate? Moreover, even
conceding that the Negro's status in American society is in many ways
unique, special treatment for him provides a foundation for other racial
or religious minorities to demand similar special treatment to rectify
82
past wrongs.
To give to government power to achieve racial or religious "balance"
is, I submit, alien to the spirit of our laws, which, in this context, are
color blind. Every departure from that spirit is a matter of the greatest
concern, and can be justified only upon a showing of overwhelming
necessity. The constitutionality of any such departure is, of course, quite
another matter. Unwise legislation does not automatically mean unconstitutional legislation. Some governmental action designed to promote integration, for example, preference in the awarding of government
contracts to integrated private firms, seems to me unobjectionable from a
constitutional viewpoint. Indeed, I find it hard to see that even governmental action in a more extreme form, such as use of "benign quotas"
in housing and employment, can fairly be characterized as unconstitu31 For an elaborate and excellent defense of the "special treatment" philosophy
see Lichtman, The Ethics of Compensatory Justice, 1 L. in Transition Q. 76
(1964).

32 The fact that numerous social and economic groups are the beneficiaries of
special government solicitude in my view provides no warrant for special consideration rooted in a racial, religious or ethnic basis. Subsidies to businesses (as,
for example, in the form of tariffs) or to the poor (as, for example, in the form

of aid

for dependent children)

involve classifications which, plainly, do not

purport to divide men on the basis of their skin or their prayer book.
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tionally "arbitrary" or "unreasonble"; and moreover, if it once be
conceded that the government may in some situations establish "benign
quotas," I doubt the possibility of fashioning any judicially neutral principle to separate the permissible from the impermissible.
There is, however, an alternative constitutional approach possible to
governmental attempts to promote integration. One could assert that,
since legislation involving racial criteria is anathema to our jurisprudence, the traditional "reasonableness" standard of the economic regulatory cases is inapposite. Rather, as in the area of freedom of speech,
action of this type can be justified only upon a showing that a substantial
governmental objective is at stake, one in which less drastic measures are
not available.3 3 Application of such standard would seem to me to bar
use of the "benign quota" method to achieve integration in a great many
contexts. For example, instead of requiring preferential hiring policies,
alternative, and less drastic, legislative measures might be sufficient to
eliminate union discrimination. (This would, of course include the elimination of the discrimination which often lies only thinly concealed in
union requirements that new members be admitted only upon the recommendation of existing members.) And in the housing area methods
less drastic than use of benign quotas seem clearly available. Consider,
for example, "public subsidies, such as bonuses to landlords whose apartments enjoy a mixed occupancy, grants to Negroes to enable them to
rent apartments or purchase homes in residential areas that would otherwise be beyond their means, or payments to include White families to
move or to stay in integrated neighborhoods.13 4
These problems are not going to disappear; more and more we hear
of the need of "special" consideration for the Negro. This is, in my view,
at the base of Negro demands concerning de facto segregation in the public schools. The Negro insists on the almost total subordination of other
educational considerations to his need for an integrated education. (Some,
indeed, have made it quite plain that they prefer total destruction of the
public school system to de facto segregation.) Rumblings are now heard
in other areas too. Adam Clayton Powell, an extremist to be sure, is
forcefully advocating preferential hiring, and it is hardly to be doubted
that many Negroes are coming to think in these terms. If a special
treatment philosophy takes a firm foothold in this revolution, conflict
is inevitable. That this is more than a shadowy possibility is apparent,
particularly in the economic area, where a sluggish economy may evoke
Negro demands for-and White reaction against-preferential hiring
83 E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); See Freund, The Supreme
Court of the United States 85-86 (1961).
34 Bittker, supra note 28, at 1411.
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policies.8 5 And this conflict could quickly transform the revolution's
character to one ugly in dimension. The possibilities are grim.
III
Whatever the possibilities for accomodation of Negro demands for
affirmative governmental action to end racial imbalance, conflict will
inevitably arise out of the promiscuous use of sit-ins, lie-ins, stall-ins,
and, most recently, kneel-ins to achieve the goals of the revolution.
We start from the familiar. The fourteenth amendment forbids state
discrimination along racial lines, however contrived. For example, a
Negro cannot be convicted of "disorderly conduct" or of "breach of the
peace" for using "White" drinking fountains in a public park, any more
than he could be convicted for violating a statute or ordinance which
specifically required segregation in the use of drinking fountains.8 6
However and whenever the state acts, it may not impose patterns of
discrimination. But the elimination of segragation from governmental
activity is only a part of the Negro revolution. The Negro demands admittance to all the components of American public life-employment,
recreational facilities, stores, and the like. Accordingly, he demands that
every vestige of segregation be eliminated from public life, whatever the
source of the discrimination, and, unwilling to wait upon the law's delays,
he freely employs the "ins" technique to achieve that end.
'So long as the "ins" technique is used to eliminate discrimination
which is itself a violation of law, no problem occurs. Thus, use of a sit-in
at a restaurant which, contrary to a state anti-discrimination law,
refuses to serve Negroes poses no special legal problems. But in a
great many states there is no anti-discrimination legislation or it is,
at best, fragmentary. Use of the "ins" technique in such a situation
threatens to place the revolution at odds with the law, since obviously the owner will rely upon his privilege under state law to discriminate. The constitutional question then becomes the extent to which
the state will be permitted to recognize or sanction a privilege on the part
of private corporations and persons to discriminate on racial lines by
providing a policeman or its courts to vindicate the privilege. This question is usually articulated in a different fashion: Since the fourteenth
amendment prohibits "state," not "private," racial discrimination, what
marks the line between "state action" and "private action"? Pressure
has been generated to open up the concept "state action," so that the
85 In fact the largest repository of "White backlash" seems even now to be
found in the economic area. Many White workers view the Negro as a threat
to their job security and fear that civil rights legislation will give Negroes an
opportunity to put them out of their jobs.
86 Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963).
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state may be charged with the discrimination in situations which arguably involve only "private" discrimination.
When the state is "significantly involved" in the activity in question,
few doubt that the discrimination is properly chargeable to it. Thus, racial
discrimination in state financed and regulated "private" hospitals, urban
renewal projects, federally guaranteed mortgage lending programs and a
host of other "private activities" which have significant governmental
underpinnings are invalid.3 7 This result is of no small moment; federal,
state and local governments are, after all, "significantly involved" in a
great deal of "private" activity. Moreover, "private" discrimination in
areas where the private person is exercising what has been historically
a "governmental" function is properly chargeable to the state. For example, discrimination by private owners of a "company town" or in a
primary election seems properly attributable to the state, since local
government and voting have traditionally involved the exercise of governmental prerogatives s
This, of course, does not mean an open road to public life for the
Negro. Considerable discrimination by "private" persons in the "public"
sector of our society would not be prohibited as a matter of constitutional
law. Not surprisingly, therefore, the absence of universal anti-discrimination legislation has generated pressures to condemn all discrimination in
public life as unconstitutional. Such an attempt, however, poses difficult
constitutional issues. The constitution prohibits only discrimination by
the state, and here the state seems to do no more than record or recognize private discrimination in which it has no "significant involvement,"
as, for example, where it "merely" supports the privilege of a restaurant
to discriminate by taking action to remove trespassers, or by granting
injunctive relief against trespassing.
Inquiry as to governing legal rules in this area must, of course,
37 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Eaton v.
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, 336 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1964); and see generally Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1458 (1961) ; Lewis,
The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960) ; Comment,
12 Kan. L. Rev. 426 (1964). Interesting problems arise as to the ultimate
reach of the notion that discrimination is chargeable to the government where it is
significantly involved in the "private" activity. For example, does that principle now
sweep within its compass charitable trusts (see In re Girard College Trusteeship,
391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958) ;
Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 Yale L.J. 979 (1957) ; Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 604 (1958)), or labor
organizations (see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) ; Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Sovern, The NLRA and Racial Discrimination, 62
Colum. L. Rev. 563 (1962) ; Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by
Labor Unions, 50 Geo. L.J. 457 (1962) ; Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor
Organization and Governmental Action, 70 Yale L.J. 345 (1961)).
38 E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); see also the materials in the preceding note, particularly the articles by
Professor Lewis; and see Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1247, 1248 (1948).
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begin with Shelley v. Kraemer," decided in 1948. There a vendor
refused to comply with a racially restrictive covenant he had signed.
The Supreme Court held that state court enforcement of the covenant
against him was unconstitutional "state" action. Shelley fascinates constitutional lawyers to this day, and poses problems far too difficult to
admit of proper treatment in this paper. The extent to which state recognition of private discrimination, where the state is not itself substantially
involved and no public function is involved, is unconstitutional is still
much debated. 40 Professor Louis Pollak would apply Shelley to prevent a state from enforcing discrimination by a private person who
does not wish to discriminate (e.g., the vendor who desires not to be
bound by a restrictive covenant he signed), but does not read the case
as preventing the state from assisting the willing private discriminator
(e.g., the store owner who does not wish to serve Negroes).41 This view
is not without its difficulties, 42 and there are those who believe that
Shelley is devoid of any satisfactory principle.48 It is not without
significance that the case has not again been relied upon the Court.
The Sit-In Cases,44 decided in 1963, represent another rolling back
of the line between state and private action. There, Negroes were denied
service at "private" lunch counters, etc.; they refused to leave and were
subsequently convicted of criminal trespass. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, it was argued that in situations like this the state is not imposing
segregation, but only neutrally employing its criminal process to permit a business to serve whomever it chooses. The convictions were set
39
40
note
Rev.
41

334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; and see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
The literature discussing the case is voluminous. See the materials cited
37 supra, and notes 41-43 infra. See also excellent Comment, 44 Calif. L.
718.
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,

13 (1959).

42 Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer; Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev.
473, 477-78 and n.10; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083,
1112 (1960).
43 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 31 (1959); Recently, there have been several attempts to re-think the
entire concept of what constitutes 'state" action. It has been suggested that while
all agree that a state command or prohibition involves state action, state in-

action-merely permitting private persons to act as they chose and enforcing that
choice (e.g., permitting vendors to sell or not to sell ice cream to Negroes or
children)-is logically also state action, the nexus to the state inhering in its
permitting and recognizing the private choice. The constitutional problem then
becomes not whether there is state action, but whether the state's decision either
to command, prohibit, or leave to private choice was a constitutionally permissible
(i.e., reasonable) decision. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1962). See also Van Alstyne & Karst, State
Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1961). This view has met with criticism. E.g., Lewis,
The Sit-In Cases-Great Expectations, 1963 S. Ct. Rev. 101, 119-130. Consider also
at this point the state "inaction" discussion in note 7 supra.
44 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 U.S. 363 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963) ; Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) ; and the per
curiam orders based thereon.
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aside. The Court noted that the states involved had decreed segregation
through statutes, ordinances or executive action, and it held that where a
state's "criminal processes are employed in a way which enforces the
discrimination mandated by that law, such 'apalpable violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to separate the
4
mental urges of the discriminators."
These decisions go quite far, but they by no means throw the
mantle of constitutional protection around Negro demands for access to
public life, nor do they insulate from attack many uses of the "ins"
techniques. Indeed, it is precisely because they do not that attempts are
now being made to roll back further the divider between "state" and
"private" action. Suppose, for example, that a Negro attempts entrance
to an "exclusive" restaurant in a state which has no publicly imposed
pattern of discrimination but also does not have a law forbidding discrimination by restaurants. He is refused service because the owner
fears a marked loss of business, and eventually the owner uses that
force necessary to eject him. Does the owner have a good defense to
an action for assault and battery? Alternatively, may the owner sue the
Negro for civil trespass or enjoin any further attempts by him to
enter? Ultimately, the answers to all these questions turn on whether,
in situations where there is no federal or state law forbidding private
discrimination, the state court's enforcement of the private discrimination constitutes forbidden state action under Shelley or The Sit-In Cases.
One state court apparently believes that under Shelley any state involvement of the kind being considered would constitute state action. 46 But
to my mind neither Shelley nor the Sit-In Cases is dispositive. In
Shelley the owner of the property was resisting attempts by other private persons to compel him to discriminate; the power of the state was
being invoked to require a person to discriminate against his wishes.
In the hypothetical above, the owner of the restaurant is a willing discriminator and seeks the aid of the law to preclude attempts at forcing
him to abandon his decision to discriminate. In the Sit-In Cases the
state was the party seeking redress, and through its criminal law was
in fact seeking to maintain its policy of discrimination. In our hypothetical the state is not a party to the litigation, and, more significantly,
it is not seeking to impose patterns of discrimination. Moreover, if the
private discriminator cannot constitutionally avail himself of civil process,
a clear anomaly results: a clash between a man with no legal right to
be where he is and an owner with no enforceable right to eject him. In
my judgment, so long as the constitution is not interpreted to bar all
private discrimination, no policy is advanced by construing it so as to
45
46

Peterson v. Greenville, supra note 44, at 248.
State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del. 1963).
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leave force as the private discriminator's only remedy. Law should be
a substitute for force, not the occasion inviting its use.
In a glance at the kinds of problems we are dealing with here, Mr.
Justice Douglas, building upon Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in the
Civil Rights Cases, insists that the term "state action" embraces not only what we have traditionally thought of as action by the state but also
the management of all "[p]laces of public accommodations such as retail stores, restaurants, and the like." The effect of this view is, of
course, to prohibit, as a matter of constitutional law, the exclusion of
47
the Negro from "the main stream of our highly interdependent life."
"There is no constitutional way, as I see it," said the justice, "in which
a state can license and supervise a business serving the public and endow
it with the authority to manage that business on the basis of apartheid
which is foreign to our Constitution." 48 The Court has recently declined
an opportunity to embrace this view, 49 and desirable though it be as a
statement of policy-indeed, it states the essence of the Negroes' aspirations-the difficulties inherent in it are so great" that its acceptance as constitutional doctrine is most unlikely.
Unfashionable thought though it may be, it seems to me that, short of
Justice Douglas' view, the limits of constitutional bars to private discrimination have been reached. Accordingly, in my view nothing in the
constitution compels restaurants and retail stores to serve Negroes and,.
absent anti-discrimination legislation, the private "privilege" to discriminate may be vindicated by resort to civil process. Of course, what
the constitution does not prohibit statutes may, and here lies the crucial
importance of state and federal anti-discrimination laws, including the
public accommodations and fair employment provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, for they are the Negroes' keys to many parts of
public life. It is difficult to overemphasize their importance. In the last
analysis they embody the soul of the revolution, they are the Negro
saying: "I am an American first, a Negro second; and like every other
American I should have access to all parts of American public life."
Having noted all this, it is still apparent that, even with the assistance
of sympathetic constitutional doctrine and antidiscrimination legislation,
the Negro revolution may be headed for collision with the law. Federal
.47 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 279 (1963); and see his concurring
opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
48 Lombard v. Louisiana, supra note 47, at 283.
49 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) ; see also Barr v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 146 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Robinson v.
Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) ; Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 233-37 (1964).
50 The mere fact that the state licenses the activity in question cannot render

the licensee's action "state action" unless one is prepared to say that all activity

of the license (e.g., a restaurant's labor policy or contracts for garbage disposal)
raise constitutional questions because they involve "state action." See materials note
43 supra.
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legislation is not intended, and constitutionally might not be able, to open
up all the doors of public life to the Negro; state anti-discrimination
legislation is either incomplete or, in southern states, non-existent. Yet
the Negro demands access to public life now, whatever the legal rights
of the local retailer to refuse him; and where economic pressure is insufficient, resort ultimately will be the "ins" techniques. In the absence of
anti-discrimination legislation, however, the Negro may soon find himself saddled with criminal prosecutions, money judgments for trespass,
injunctions, and contempt citations. And, if so, the Negro for the
first time will obtain. no relief from the federal courts; for the first time
he will find that the law and his aspirations are not necessarily identical.
Conflict on this score will by no means be confined to the south;
indeed, the very differences between segregation in the south and in the
north indicate that they will be first seriously confronted in northern
states. In the south the Negro is still busy eradicating "official" supports
for discrimination. Elsewhere his efforts are on a quite different plane.
Official discrimination is in principle absent, and there is an ample
supply of anti-discrimination legislation. But patterns of discrimination
tenaciously persist among many employers, unions, restaurants, retail
stores, etc. Discrimination northern style is at once less intense but
more insidious, less pervasive but more elusive, less proclaimed but
more hypocritical than its southern counterpart, and it is of far too significant dimension to be overlooked. The affront to Negro dignity is
considerable too, for here he sees that, whatever the law, a great many
of his fellow citizens refuse him recognition. Thus his temper mounts, and
he places heavy reliance on sit-ins, lie-ins, and the like to push out private discriminations. However, in the North these tactical devices often
may be employed in a way that demands enforcement of criminal and
civil statutes against them, for as often as not they are not limited to the
locus of the offending employer or restaurant. They are far more general
in character, far more in the nature of dramatic public protests; they
take on the character of secondary boycotts, with the general public being subjected to the boycott. Thus we constantly read of attempts to
clog great highways and bridges at rush hour, stall trains, bar access to
the World's Fair (although there is no contention that the Fair is discriminating), and the like. But, plainly, blocking a public way is criminal
conduct and punishable as such, and no contention is possible that in
enforcing these laws, the state is enforcing segregation. Manifestly,
use of the "ins" technique in this fashion places the Negro revolution at
odds with the law.

IV

Over one hundred years ago, Henry Thoreau posed sharply for his
generation the issue of civil disobedience. The next few years will see
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the same issue posed for us. The Negro grows increasingly impatient
with the law's delays, and he is just now beginning to consider the
extent to which he will violate "just" laws in order to dramatize and
accentuate his protest. He has not, of course, adopted violence as a
technique for violating the law; rather, his present concern is with the
limits of peaceful non-compliance. But one cannot overemphasize the
importance of the answer he gives to the general question of peaceful
noncompliance. The law has enough soft spots (such as the prosecutor's
discretion whether or not to prosecute) to permit toleration of some disobedience; but toleration of some is by no means toleration of all, and
what is overlooked may well turn on what is done. The society will not
tolerate "peaceful" protests which result in blocking highways, bridges,
or the like; indeed, it cannot-to do so would submerge every value to
the single one of integration. 51 Accordingly, if the Negro persists in
conduct of this kind, he renders serious collision between the law and
the revolution inevitable, to say nothing of exacerbating the slowly
mounting "White backlash."
The Negro revolution has reached a crossroad, and its ultimate path is
by no means certain. The Negro is angry and above all impatient with
delay; he has suffered too long to suffer change slowly. But the danger is
that the momentum of the revolution will cause it to outrun the counsels
of prudence and become a runaway train. Such a development could
turn around the whole character of the revolution. At this stage, the
Negro wants only to be an American; he does not reject the society he
is in-he wants to be a part of it. And he realizes that the law, the official
measure of society's conscience, is committed to his goal. But the
revolutionary makes no fine legal distinctions; gray is not a color in his
spectrum. If law becomes one more stumbling block, the Negro may
come to view it as another yoke to be thrown off. Such a development,
either alone or in conjunction with, other factors, could radically alter
the revolution's character, from one in which the Negro wants acceptance into the American society to one in which he rejects that society.
Such a transformation has potential consequences so great as to stagger
the imagination; in sum, it could turn what is loosely referred to as a
"revolution" into something which more closely approximates the
historical model of a revolution-organized resistance to the government.
A question persists, therefore, which needs to be answered. Can the
Negro revolution stay tolerably well within the limits prescribed by the
51. Indeed, there is now some concern that Negroes are escaping prosecution
for violation of criminal laws such as disorderly conduct precisely because they
are Negroes, police officers and prosecutors being fearful of an "anti-Negro"
label.
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legal order? If it cannot, the end result might be a "Negro revolution"
which rejects the whole society, and perhaps one which will destroy it
one way or the other-a far cry from the principles which gave the
"revolution" birth.

